

An Examination of the Ways in which Human Resources Can Have an Impact on Democracy in Indonesia During the 2024 Election: The Expectations and Realities of Democracy in Indonesia

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Abstract

In the context of analyzing the democratic celebrations that will take place in Indonesia during the general election in 2024, this research is of considerable urgency. Despite the fact that one facet of this democratic exercise allows residents to freely express their political views in a tranquil setting, on the other hand, the adoption of such democratic principles raises concerns among a great number of people with regard to the results of the general election that will take place in 2024. In order to determine the degree to which the expectations and realities of democracy in Indonesia are met, the purpose of this study is to conduct an analysis of the most important elements that influence the implementation of democracy in the country. To determine the factors that influence the implementation of democracy, qualitative research methodologies were utilized, and the NVIVO software was utilized to conduct the analysis. A detailed compilation of aspects relating to the elements that influence the implementation of democracy was carried out, and the levels of achievement with which they were achieved were evaluated. In light of the findings of the research, it appears that the level of achievement in the implementation of democracy is still relatively low in comparison to the fully developed democracy that is desired. All parties involved need to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation in order to collectively actualize Indonesia's democratic values. This is because the ramifications of these achievements and aspirations are significant.

Keywords: democratic celebrations; general election 2024; political expression; implementation of democracy; NVIVO software.

1. Introduction

Decision-making processes within conventional energy systems by stakeholders involved in regulating these conventional energy governance systems, typically a small group of elites and government officials, have resulted in a widespread perception that the energy system is detached from societal life and comprises complex technologies that are challenging to comprehend. This

elitist governance practice, aimed at enhancing efficiency, has remarkably increased productivity. However, by excluding the majority of people from the decision-making process, it has triggered a crisis in democracy [1] According to Kristianto, Arinanto, and Ghafur [2], between 2019 and 2021, the quality of democracy in Indonesia has been steadily declining. After his re-election in 2019, President Jokowi adopted a two-pronged strategy towards influential Islamic movements in the country, which have become increasingly prominent since the mid-2010s. On one hand, another strategy integrates more moderate Islamic figures into his government, including a conservative cleric, notably as the vice president in 2019. On the other hand, the government banned a significant organization in December 2020 and detained its charismatic supporters. Both strategies curtail liberal freedoms, albeit in very different ways. While conservative themes socially and politically entrench in government discourse, space for opposition to the regime (in any form) is increasingly restricted. The COVID-19 crisis also served as an opportunity for the government to curb radical movements, ultimately overlooking societal protests against several policies implemented under the guise of maintaining social distance. Several controversial laws were passed by parliament in 2020 that might have faced challenges under normal circumstances without the pandemic condition. One of these is the highly contested Omnibus Law by labor unions and other activists.

Alternatively [3], the United States and its allies should engage in economic diplomacy with China, and the Trump Administration was astute in creating and securing Congressional funding (through the BUILD Act) for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation amounting to \$60 billion (USIDFC). However, by portraying U.S. money as good and Chinese money as "harmful," the United States risks competing poorly with China in this realm. Most countries would still welcome Chinese investment and expertise in building new infrastructure, especially in post-colonial nationalist environments like Southeast Asia; leaders won't appreciate if the United States is depicted as foolish or a victim in the process. Instead, the United States should merely offer alternative opportunities with a cleaner and more transparent process that may appeal to various developing countries. However, the goal is not to prevent or cut off China's activities, but to incentivize Beijing to provide more transparency and accountability in their own lending.

An intriguing concept in U.S. Asia policy [3] was proposed by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, representing the United States at the 2019 East Asia Summit and ASEAN Summit; namely the "blue dot network," a certification process where investment projects in the region can be assessed for transparency, sustainability, and mutual benefit. Particularly, this initiative is a trilateral effort by the United States, Japan, and Australia. Involvement of similar-minded countries in the Asia Pacific makes sense. This is especially true for Japan, which has been actively involved in infrastructure projects in Southeast and South Asia for several decades. But in my meetings in Southeast Asia, skepticism arose that the United States, in particular, lacks the expertise or political flexibility to sustain such a research mission. Moreover, the timing of this concept was off as President Trump himself did not attend the East Asia and ASEAN Summits where this concept was launched. Trump later invited ASEAN leaders to come to the United States instead, a series of gestures deemed disrespectful and demeaning among my interlocutors in Indonesia and Thailand in the same month. One solution to this problem might be for the

United States to enhance its diplomatic engagement with ASEAN as President Obama did as part of the "pivot" to Asia and, more importantly, invite ASEAN countries.

According to Thorbecke [4], the Indonesian economy has faced periods of prosperity and setbacks in commodities, crises, and the transition from authoritarian regimes towards democracy. Starting in 2020, Indonesia faced the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation, contractionary US monetary policies, and commodity price hikes.

2. Literature Review

1. Driving Forces of Democracy

Grossman and Guinaudeau [5] discuss issues related to the implementation of democracy, particularly focusing on the extent to which potential driving forces can be executed by the state as a powerholder through regulations or the state as a regulator. They explore the extent to which changes in democratic values contribute to "broadening the standards of democracy" and "politics on issues receiving widespread attention."

The argument of the state as a regulator in significantly expanding the standards of democracy was developed by Giandomenico Majone in 1996 and 1997. According to this argument, increasing regulation is a response to gradual changes in the histories of states, leading to the progressive replacement of autonomous state forms with regulatory states. In Europe, this change became a trend, especially during the large wave of privatization of public companies that began in the 1980s in the UK. Privatization in electricity and telecommunications companies spearheaded this evolution, emphasizing the importance of creating new values in regulating public companies and the emergence of independent bodies to ensure impartial regulation enforcement. What are the actual empirical implications of this argument regarding the shift from autonomous states to regulatory states in democracy implementation? Fundamentally, by launching privatization programs in these companies, there is expected to be a correlation between the launch of privatization programs and the emergence of policies that regulate the implementation of the program, distinguishing it from other policies, especially those that are more costly, categorized as distributive policies, and policies that redistribute repeatedly.

The empirical implications of the above argument are similar to those derived from scholarly works that base their arguments on the influence of globalization in all fields and the increasing constraints of required capital that limit the political benefits gained by domestic politicians to maneuver. Discourses on globalization and increasing political capital constraints have been discussed since the 1990s regarding how globalization effectively influences states and whether it impacts state forms and capacities. The debate primarily concerns the impacts on the autonomy of states, the interdependence of influences between states, or the capacity to fulfill the capital expenditures of political events and the possibility of governments taking part in partisan political decisions. For instance, Streeck argues that in political activities, state spending policies will be increasingly constrained by state debt payments, reducing policy flexibility in intensive state spending activities. Consequently, for governments to be involved, governments must take action. In line with the above thoughts, previous scholarly works argue that since the late 1980s,

globalization has made governing states particularly difficult, especially for left-leaning states to make a difference in democracy implementation when they are in power. Increased competition between states in fiscal economics contributes to this government involvement trend or even exacerbates it.

2. Political Groups

According to Simien [6], the implementation of democracy in the United States has historically seen the presence of minority groups since the beginning as initial candidates, reflecting visually emerging marginalized groups in elections. This indicates that greater access to democracy provides opportunities for marginalized groups to participate in elections and motivates political behavior among their voters, described by political analysts as those on the political fringes of America. The entire political process will take place only if they engage in campaigns throughout the political process. The battle to win elections is fiercely contested and has a significant influence, especially when the first candidates from these minority groups unite their diverse group of voters and build multiracial coalitions to oppose conservative groups that continue to suppress their vote and even implement voting restrictions. Loyalty to group candidates or a sense of ownership over the group evokes emotions towards the process, where strong intragroup emotions such as pride in increasing group pride emerge, resulting in heightened solidarity in experienced events, and the influence of socially related community figures leads to significant changes, where for the first time in their history in general elections, they will be elected public officials, acting as agents of change in conducted campaigns, emerging as drivers of more liberal and progressive public policies. Thus, it can be seen that the history of minority group nominations in US democracy cannot be separated from issues of their representation, electoral viability, and demonstrated performance. Similarly, what is envisioned in elections, where Donald Trump was elected, seen as a highly unconventional election in 2016 for these minority groups during Donald Trump's first term as President of America, also in the midterm elections to elect congressional members in 2018, and subsequent US presidential elections in 2020, will continue to be the subject of innovative analysis like this.

3. Measuring Democracy Implementation

According to Harrison [7] in conducting democratic general elections, three crucial steps can be taken to test whether the general elections comply with democracy implementation or are merely arbitrary. First, it is acknowledged that in democratic countries, citizens are always free to express consistent frustration on every occasion, almost continuously expressed, so the first important thing to do is how to listen to and understand everything they express as part of the frustration they express in their own words. Based on the collection of data from interviews and responses relying on two sets of data, namely in-depth narrative interview results and responses to open-ended survey questions, asking the public to explain what first comes to mind when they think about democracy implementation, the answer is that they feel frustrated with the democracy implementation that can only occasionally have a positive impact. Second, by using a deductive model in implementing democracy, which is sometimes called having a positive impact, frustration with democracy is measured and compared with dimensions and other related components. The frustration of democracy and its components are then mapped

4. Bureaucracy of Democracy

In the post-war implementation of democracy, numerous political factors influence the collaborative management among political actors, viewed through the lens of political science related to operational activities and interactions among them, politicians, and administrative implementers working within democratic systems such as the federal system in the US. In the United States, this collaborative management includes the collection of statistical data and information, as well as studies on cooperative programs and activities in the interactions between states within the federal framework and/or the federal framework interacting with states. Throughout the 20th century in the United States, extensive cooperation in programs and activities has been evident within the federal system. For example, activities related to the relationship between the federal government and states in law enforcement through police training programs, crime identification, and enforcement against drug abuse, carried out jointly with the US Postal Services (USPS) and federal agencies inspecting agricultural products and hazardous substances, based on collaboration between federal and state governments. Collaborative management, although actively part of the bureaucratic framework since the early 20th century, has increased, especially after the expansion of the federal government in the 1950s. Experts in the United States view intergovernmental relations in collaborative management during this period as cooperative federalism, occurring in "complementary and supportive relationships." This development has been the most prominent and significant in the journey of democracy in the United States. It has impacted collaborative federalism, which has become a legacy of administrative management frequently carried out by US administrators.

Administrative support in the implementation of democracy from the outset aimed to meet the needs of central and territorial state institutions implementing rules established to support democracy, service standards, and support for democracy, and to carry out financial support practices for central government programs and funding in compliance with local legislation and regulations. However, in the post-civil war era, which was a period of joint administrative support among state institutions with a tendency to passively review democracy's progress, attention was given to integrity in legal provisions' implementation and enforcement, which in normal conditions differs from strict and comprehensive oversight. By applying some basic administrative rules, each region of the area, legally has significant freedom to implement democracy programs and activities, generally tailored to regional traditions and local wisdom. During the aforementioned post-civil war period, the management of institutional program support tended to be conducted with minimal special supervision or monitoring, but with developments towards post-war improvement, the expansion of supervision and project implementation can be carried out massively between central and regional governments.

5. Political Impact

In addressing the issue of dependency on false news, the popular response is to reject all definitional explanations about the meaning of manipulated images. To support the stance of rejecting this definition, firstly, citing Kripke in 1972, Putnam in 1975, and Burge in 1979, arguing for externalism that states that the language's meaning in false news conveyed to the public and the externally individualized thought content is measured from the recognized common factual environment. A classic example can be given here, the chemical structure of

water is symbolized by the formula H₂O because it is naturally recognized that the term's meaning is indexed based on the fact that water mostly consists of hydrogen and oxygen forming H₂O. In line with that explanation, if someone is given false news or manipulated news, then first and foremost they need to think about the structure of water, and thus the externally individualized thought content related to false news about water, can be measured by facts about water.

In explaining false news with the above example of water, just like the example of false news about Twin Earth proposed by Putnam. Explaining thoughts about the structure of water is not the same as when thinking about the structure of a colorless, odorless, and transparent liquid. Looking at externalistic externalism, as an additional bonus in viewing false news, Quine's Argument also states that externalistic thinking forms are also in line with thinking styles that oppose analysis from an individual. Consider the argument below, which is not based on events that have already happened, but this did not happen, just by considering its argument first. Arguments like those mentioned above are already widely understood. This argument is seen from the definition theory about the concept or meaning of the word represented based on that theory's analysis (in a broad sense, the recognized meaning of the word) which is the core of the theory. Arguments from statements like the definition of words from a legal perspective recognized as the definition of the word or the meaning of the concept represented (whether the concept is in the form of individual cognition or in the form of recognized theses about the meaning of recognized public language) which makes certain statements true, and after analysis is true, but in the false news spread, it is not actually the case. For example, a theory stating that if the properties of the smallest constituent elements of the universe that cannot be divided further are characteristics of chemical elements, then the statement that atoms cannot be further divided analytically is true. However, according to Quine in 1951, the idea of analysis of atoms like that is not entirely well understood, and further understanding of atoms depends on the idea of the smallest constituents of the universe, which, in turn, the understanding is circulated following its analytical assumptions.

In understanding how externalism treats false news like this, in certain cases, it is suitable for the meanings of certain words in language communication understood by the public in the context of conditional truth, although, this raises further problems as part of the general theory of lexical meaning. First, in its elaboration, the meaning of words in false news does not always follow the characteristics of indirect facts but sometimes defined explicitly according to the purpose of the false news. In the context of spreading false news, the meaning of the word conveyed depends on the theoretical analysis underlying the words or images in the false news, namely the theory whose analysis simultaneously provides credibility to the recognition of facts and sufficiency in the characteristics definition it represents and is appropriate in its use. Moreover, each word or image from false news has a scale of characteristics stage definitions, both indirect meanings of words and explicit definitions intended. Often, a word in false news is used in a way that defines it without making its definition explicit. One can define the meaning of false news of a triangle more or less precisely according to its purpose, not the intended definition of the triangle, or one can provide a more intuitive understanding of false news based on examples of triangles. It's difficult to understand where individual externalistic analysis of false news begins and where it should end. Semantic externalistic analysis mostly only tells stories for everyday nouns

convincingly for empirical objects like water, tigers, and pencils, and other explanations besides what they mean from false news remain mysterious for the use of words in understanding democracy, dark matter that is invisible, triangles, and owned institutions.

Further explanation from the theoretical perspective of false news, as mentioned above, to overcome it is pursued with rationality, but then further questioned about metalinguistic disputes that become definitional approaches to the meaning of words and concepts in idiolexical (lexical theory) as explained above. If suppose this false news is individual information that can be externally understood, then why and how could the news become a public debate? Note the debate put forward by Plunkett and Sundell in 2013 stating that disputes in metalinguistics can be substantive, even though some of the false news is also not substantive. For example, John and Mary debate about false news about what appears to be a chair, and after some time of debating

6. Post-Reformation Democracy

Lane [8] suggests that democracy in Indonesia post-1998, marked by the Reform era, has shown gradual improvements in its implementation. By the end of 2020, the Indonesian government's structure was deemed increasingly refined, even after being tested by events that served as trials of democracy for over a year after 2019. It's acknowledged that the implementation of democracy in governance shifted after 1998, moving away from a system run by political strategies supported by elite groups with strong loyalty and extensive influence. Instead, it transformed into a more collective form of governance, albeit with a weakening absolutist class absolutism recently. Between 1998 and 2019, the commitment to collective governance by political party coalitions was undermined by internal divisions and competition, particularly notable during the 2013–2019 period. The establishment of a collective working team by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) at the end of 2019, involving ministers from various supporting parties, has contributed to greater stability in Indonesian political life over the last twenty-four months compared to previous Jokowi administrations. However, the durability of this governmental stability remains uncertain.

The Reform era, initiated by President Suharto's resignation in late May 1998 amid massive opposition support for Reform, marked the end of a prolonged authoritarian regime of thirty-two years. The collapse of authoritarian power in each regime wasn't just about the presidency but also involved significant changes to the entire authoritarian governance structure, particularly its supporting elements. The emergence of the New Order regime followed the collapse of Sukarno's regime, involving the physical and institutional collapse of all supporting forces behind Sukarno and the left-wing alliance between 1957 and 1965, despite the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) not reaching the pinnacle of governmental power. The breakdown of these supporting elements, notably the PKI and affiliated left-wing organizations, alongside smaller parties, occurred during the New Order's rise. Analyzing the supporting elements' collapse, especially in New Order political publications, reveals a shift in mass policy perspectives and grassroots support mobilization, resulting in changes evident in current school textbooks.

7. Political Misinformation

According to Evanty and Yunita [9], academic literature views fake news as information dissemination using manipulated images or misrepresentation. Examples include fabricated images portraying Megawati Soekarno Putri, the founder and Chairwoman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), carrying President Jokowi on her back. Such fake news distorts reality to influence public perception systematically, suggesting that the current government is dominated by Megawati, potentially causing public outrage and moral distortion. Another instance involves false news regarding hijab-wearing civil servants in Jakarta universities, causing psychological distress and even resignation due to the continuous pressure exerted by misleading information. Research conducted in 2023 by Evanty et al. employed qualitative methods to analyze misinformation's impact on female legislative candidates during the 2019 national election campaign, leading to their failure and withdrawal from candidacy.

8. Identity Politics

Sisco et al. [10] argue that identity politics, despite criticism, remains prevalent in contemporary American politics. Initially, identity politics gained prominence during the 2007/2008 Democratic Party nomination contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, intensifying further in the 2016 elections. In the 2020 elections, identity politics was forefront, exemplified by the election of the first African-American female Vice President, fueling various social movements such as Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and Rainbow Wave campaigns. The future success and impact of identity politics, particularly on traditional party identities, remain subject to ongoing scrutiny and discourse, especially concerning the 2024 elections.

9. Spread of Islam

The highlights of the significant role played by Muslim intellectuals from Makkah and Madinah in disseminating Islam's knowledge and fostering socio-cultural transformations in the Indonesian archipelago. These intellectuals, trained in Saudi Arabia, directly influenced by Sufism, contributed to Islam's spread in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago from the thirteenth to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their teachings, emphasizing tolerance for Javanese and Sumatran traditions, shaped a new face of Islam, particularly among the nobility and coastal communities in Java and Sumatra.

10. Patronage Politics

Aspinal et al. [11] conducted a literature review on patronage politics, particularly focusing on its forms and implications, especially in conjunction with identity politics. They highlight how patronage politics provides specific benefits to voters, such as cash handouts or employment opportunities, often at the expense of democratic values. The practice of patronage politics alongside identity politics is an intriguing topic, especially regarding the various responses of Southeast Asian politicians to the challenges of patronage politics. In Indonesia, patronage politics often involves candidates distributing cash gifts to individual voters, organized through brokers similar to the Obet mayoral election in the Philippines. Concerns among Indonesian election candidates about the loyalty of cash-receiving voters and the brokers involved are notable. Similarly to candidates in the Philippines, Indonesian candidates also provide assistance

to individuals or groups, such as funding for community infrastructure projects, but with a lesser degree of collaboration among candidates in designing campaign strategies or building interconnected networks. Indonesian candidates rely more on long-term reciprocal relationships with voters rather than extensive collaboration with campaign teams.

11. Democracy in the US

According to Liu [12] during Trump's presidency, identity politics exacerbated fears among white Americans of the growing influence of black and Hispanic minorities, who have historically faced racial hostility from white Americans. This racial animosity was evident in Alabama, where the Republican Party called for the impeachment of Representative Ilhan Omar from Minnesota's 5th congressional district due to her criticism, controversial statements, and alleged anti-Semitic and anti-American sentiments. Ilhan Omar, one of the first two Muslim women elected to the US House of Representatives in 2018, faced backlash for her identity and political stance. Understanding the racial and religious tensions fueled by identity politics during the Trump era requires revisiting the political environment cultivated prior to his presidency. In the years leading up to Trump's election, fears stemming from identity politics manifested differently, with concerns about minority religions gaining prominence, particularly evident during the 2012 Republican primaries when the nomination of Mitt Romney, a Mormon, prompted widespread fears and intensified support for religious minorities. However, despite this fear, Romney's candidacy did not secure the presidency, as white Christian voters remained the strongest base within the electorate.

3. Research Method

Reference sources for this research taking from various types and diverse of perspective of origins that play a crucial role in every codes of the research project, including qualitative endeavors [13]. NVivo analysis can be utilized to work with this type of data. Analysis can commence with coding, reflection, identifying discussion points, and querying reference materials, similar to interviews, focus groups, or image series.

To aid this process, NVivo Analysis is employed by importing sources in portable document format (PDF), web pages captured with NCapture, or notes and articles stored in your bibliographic database (EndNote, RefWorks, or Zotero). Although NVivo does not substitute the reference functions provided by bibliographic programs, it does offer a rapid means to input gathered and read literature into the research, thereby enhancing the analysis of the literature and promptly accessing relevant materials when pouring over reviews or research reports.


4. Result

Based on NVIVO analysis, there exists a gap between the expectations of democracy implementation [2] and the reality of the 2024 general elections [14]. The research findings measure the factors [11] influencing democracy implementation [15] in the recent general elections, considering aspects of democracy implementation itself [16], the rationality of political

information in channeling societal political aspirations [17], the processes involved in executing democracy for the community [18], with measurements taken from the perspective of Islam [16]. Additionally, the level of political participation in the community [19] and how post-truth [20] influences their attitudes after the general elections [21] were also assessed. Furthermore, an evaluation was conducted on the extent of democracy achievement in Indonesia [22] and the political perceptions of Indonesian society regarding democracy implementation [23].

The influence of factors that still affect the democracy gap can be observed in Diagram I below:

Diagram I. Gap between Expectations and Reality in the 2024 General Elections



Measurement of democracy achievement in Indonesia based on the analysis of factors measured between the expectations and reality of democracy includes measurement of the driving force of democracy characterized by the potential driving force carried out by the state as the holder of power through regulations or the state as a regulator of political groups and bureaucracy in the implementation of democracy contributing to the achievement of real democracy by 1.22%. Measurement of the contribution of political groups is seen from their role in changes in campaigns, which emerge as drivers of more liberal and progressive public policies. Meanwhile, the contribution of bureaucracy is seen from collaborative management that actively becomes part of the bureaucratic framework since the early 20th century.

Measurement of the Implementation of Democracy and Islam is seen from the entire political process that occurs, which only if they participate in campaigns in all political processes contribute only 0.55%. Other aspects examined from the implementation of democracy in Indonesia after 1998, marked by reform, show an increasingly improved implementation.

Political Impact: examined from the linguistic meaning of fake news conveyed to the public and the individualized thought content externally measured from the facts of truth in the shared environment recognized to contribute to the achievement of real democracy by 0.47%.

Measurement is also conducted on Political Information: examined from the impact of civil servants and the public believing that the fake news is true and continuously pressured at work, which ultimately leads to resignation, contributing to real democracy by 0.69%, besides the aspect of Political Identity examined from the current known political identity issues, which previously never became influential political issues.

Another aspect measured against the reality of democracy is the spread of Islam: examined from the thinkers who are part of the Muslim intellectual network from the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, who with their support and intellectual insight return to Indonesia, contributing by 0.48%.

Lastly, the aspect measured is political Patronage: encompassing all things about political patrons (most often done by solely prioritizing self-interest in politics) and how the influence of democracy in the US is examined by understanding identity politics that create racial and religious tensions during the Trump era, which spread widely, related to identity politics seen from the political environment previously nurtured to develop uncertain racial relations, contributing by 1.08%.

The outcomes of the measurement conducted on all the aforementioned factors, based on the influence they exerted, can be observed in the following Table 1 below:

Table 1: Measurement Coverage of the Assessed Aspects

Aspek Pengukuran	Percentage coverage
Implementation of Democracy and Islam	0.55%
Patronage Politics	1.08%
Political impact	0.47%
Political Information	0.69%
Spread of Islam	0.48%
The driving force of democracy	1.22%

Next, measurements were conducted to determine how the developmental direction of the assessed aspects progresses in parallel with each other based on the Pearson correlation coefficients in Table 2 as follows:

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Developmental Directions of the Assessed

Code A	Code B	Pearson correlation coefficient
Spread of Islam	Codes\\Political impact	0.301505
The driving force of democracy	Codes\\Political impact	0.232246
Political Information	Codes\\Patronage Politics	0.230623
The driving force of democracy	Codes\\Spread of Islam	0.19278
Spread of Islam	Codes\\Patronage Politics	0.157835
Political impact	Codes\\Patronage Politics	0.146489
Political Information	Codes\\Political impact	0.131453
Patronage Politics	Codes\\Implementation of Democracy and Islam	0.090561
The driving force of democracy	Codes\\Patronage Politics	0.082382
Spread of Islam	Codes\\Political Information	0.077573
Political Information	Codes\\Implementation of Democracy and Islam	-0.018888
Spread of Islam	Codes\\Implementation of Democracy and Islam	-0.025264
The driving force of democracy	Codes\\Political Information	-0.030152
Political impact	Codes\\Implementation of Democracy and Islam	-0.050056
The driving force of democracy	Codes\\Implementation of Democracy and Islam	-0.050718

The Pearson correlation coefficients provided in the table 2 are Spread of Islam vs. Political Impact as 0.301505 mean there is a moderate positive correlation between the spread of Islam and political impact. This indicates that as the spread of Islam increases, the political impact becomes more significant, and vice versa.

The Driving Force of Democracy vs. Political Impact as 0.232246 mean there is a moderately strong positive correlation between the driving force of democracy and political impact. This suggests that as the drive for democracy strengthens, the political impact becomes more significant, and vice versa.

The Political Information vs. Patronage Politics as 0.230623 mean there is a moderately strong positive correlation between political information and patronage politics. This implies that as the level of political information increases, the significance of patronage politics also increases, and vice versa.


The Driving Force of Democracy vs. Spread of Islam as 0.19278 mean there is a moderately strong positive correlation between the driving force of democracy and the spread of Islam. This suggests that as the drive for democracy strengthens, the spread of Islam increases, and vice versa.

The Spread of Islam vs. Patronage Politics as 0.157835 mean there is a weak positive correlation between the spread of Islam and patronage politics. This indicates a slight positive relationship between the spread of Islam and the practice of patronage politics.

The political Impact vs. Patronage Politics as 0.146489 mean there is a weak positive correlation between political impact and patronage politics. This suggests that as the political impact increases, the significance of patronage politics also increases, and vice versa.

And so forth for the other pairs of aspects. The interpretation of the Pearson correlation coefficients allows us to understand the relationship between various measured aspects and how they develop over time. The profile of research respondents using the NVIVO method can be seen in Table 3 as follows:

Table 3 Profile of 15 respondents



5. Conclusion

The measurement of the fulfillment of expectations and the reality of democracy in the 2024 general elections in Indonesia indicates a still low achievement. This measurement encompasses aspects of the implementation of democracy itself, the rationality of political information in channeling the political aspirations of the public, the processes involved in practicing democracy for communities measuring it from the perspective of Islam. Additionally, the measurement also includes the level of political participation of the public and how identity politics influences their attitudes in participating in the general elections. Furthermore, it also assesses the extent of democracy achievement in Indonesia and political information to the Indonesian public post-reform movement.

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