

The attitude of Democratic Front Party for Peace and Equality towards Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Camp David Accords, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978

Kadhun Wadi Khashan, Ameera Reshak Lauabi

History Department, College of Education for Humanities, University of Basrah, Iraq.
Email: Pgs.kadem.wade@uobsrah.edu.iq

Abstract

The research reviewed the position of the Democratic Front Party for Peace and Equality towards the visit made by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, resulted from that visit was an agreement with the Israeli side to sign the Camp David Accords, which were signed in 1978, that agreement which the Arabs in general and the Democratic Front in particular considered a loss of the rights of the Palestinians and the Arab cause. The research also reviewed the position of the Front on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978.

Keywords: Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, Hadash, Camp David Accords, Lebanon, Palestine.

1. Introduction

The Knesset's invitation to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to visit Israel caused a great stir in Egyptian, Arab and Israeli circles, between supporters and opponents of the visit. The invitation came after President Sadat expressed his readiness to visit Israel in a speech he delivered before the Egyptian Parliament on November 9, 1977, in order to bring peace to the region, according to their opinion. The visit took place despite the opposition of the Arab countries to the visit, which resulted in the signing of the Camp David Accords, which were unfair to the Palestinian cause and Arab rights in their lands, and which were considered an official recognition of the Israeli presence on the usurped Arab lands. The Arabs considered it a betrayal of the Arab cause. The position of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) party was clear, as it strongly rejected the Camp David Accords because they did not meet any of the Palestinian rights to establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The party also condemned the operation carried out by a group of Palestinian youth in 1978, which seized an Israeli bus and attempted to take it to the Lebanese border, which resulted in the Zionist entity's invasion of Lebanon that began at dawn on March 14, 1978, and just as the party strongly condemns the Israeli actions against innocent Palestinians and Lebanese, it also condemns those criminal actions against the Israelis.

First: The attitude of Democratic Front for Peace and Equality towards Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978

Israel witnessed the ninth Knesset elections on May 17, 1977, and the results resulted in the defeat of the Al-Maraj Party by the Likud, and the transfer of power to their leader, Menachem Begin, which some considered a political coup at the level of power in "Israel". The Likud's rise to power was accompanied by Begin's exploitation of the speech of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat before the Egyptian Parliament on November 9, 1977, in which he announced his readiness to visit "Israel" and deliver a speech before the Knesset in order to bring peace to the region, which the Israelis received and quickly sent him an official invitation through the American embassy in Cairo to visit "Israel" (1). The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality "Hadash" party rejected the Egyptian position and considered that step a leap over the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and the Egyptian regime represented by President Anwar Sadat throwing itself into the arms of American imperialism, and that Egypt did not fight the battles against "Israel" alone and did not occupy Not only its land, but "Israel" has occupied the lands of other Arab countries, and it must take into consideration the opinions of the rest of the Arab countries and maintain the Arab consensus and the unified position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue (2).

On November 15, 1977, to consider the matter of inviting Sadat to "Israel", the Front members refrained from attending the Knesset sessions, and the party's leader, Meir Vilner, expressed his party's position by saying, "The exchange of praise between Sadat and Begin is a good thing for establishing peace and preventing a new war, and that the party is interested in removing the specter of bloodshed that looms over the region, and that all the peoples of the world are interested in liquidating the war stove in the Middle East" (3), but he denounced this matter by asking whether this influential position would lead to peace? He stressed that if the meeting of Sadat and Begin would lead to a just peace that would guarantee the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and lead to Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories, then this step would be supported; But this is nothing more than a major American maneuver to divert attention from the Israeli crimes in the occupied territories. Vilner asked, addressing his words to the Israeli government: "Will 'Israel' withdraw from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and Sinai? Or will Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who declared the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be liberated areas, withdraw?" (4).

On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrived in Israel amidst a warm military reception and welcome from the leaders of the Israeli occupation, its former prime ministers, and its sectarian leaders. The next day, Sadat insisted during his visit to Jerusalem, as he went to perform the Eid prayer at Al-Aqsa Mosque amidst heavy guard from Israeli security forces. Sadat was received with applause and cheers from the worshipers who lined up to receive and welcome him (5). After the Eid prayer, Sadat went with Begin to the "Bad Vashem" Foundation (6) to visit the memorial to the victims of Nazism. Sadat arrived at the hall of the Israeli Knesset, and after the Speaker of the Knesset introduced him, he went to the platform and delivered his famous speech with great calm and composure (7). During Sadat's presence in the Knesset, he met with members of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality Party, which included Meir Vilner,

Tawfiq Toubi, Charlie Bitton, Tawfiq Ziad, and Hanna Moise. Vilner said, addressing Sadat: "We see in the proposals that "I presented it to the Knesset as a correct basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue, and that you proposed to the Knesset that we (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and representatives of the Palestinian people) go together to Geneva to sign a peace agreement and put an end to the wars and call for the withdrawal of "Israel" from all the territories occupied in 1967, and to guarantee the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and the establishment of their independent state and mutual recognition between "Israel" and the Arab states," Wilner asked, directing a question to Sadat, "Why did you not mention the Palestine Liberation Organization?" It is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognized by the Arab countries and the United Nations, and no agreement can be reached unless "Israel" recognizes the PLO (8). However, Sadat's meeting with the party members did not last more than ten minutes, and he apologized to them for the lack of time and left the meeting place. Welner denounced Sadat's refusal to answer those legitimate questions about the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and emphasized the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state (9). It seems that Sadat had made his decision to move forward with peace with Israel, according to the Egyptian point of view, without paying attention to the demands of others, because he was certain of the difficulty of achieving a comprehensive solution.

Following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement at Camp David between Begin and Sadat, on September 17, and after Begin's return to "Israel," that is, on September 20, 1978, Begin announced to journalists that there would be no Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and that "Israel" would continue its military control over the West Bank and Gaza under any agreement. He added: "The de facto annexation of Jerusalem is not subject to negotiation at all, and that Jerusalem is the capital of "Israel" and will not be divided" (10).

As for Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister, he stressed the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and his refusal to abide by the decisions related to refugees, and his rejection of any form of self-determination for the Palestinian people, and his adherence to claims of Israeli sovereignty, and his adherence to the settlements and what he called the right of the Jews. As for the Israeli government, it issued assurances to the parties allied with it in the Knesset that there would be no change in Israeli policy regarding the occupied territories (11). The Front Party denounced those irresponsible statements that contradict what Sadat announced that he would sign an agreement that would preserve Palestinian rights and establish their independent state. In the official statement issued by the Front Party on September 26, 1978, which was directed to the Israeli government, it stressed that "the Palestinian issue is the central issue in the Israeli-Arab conflict, and without a just and realistic solution to it, all talk about peace is meaningless. There is no meaning to a separate peace with the Egyptians that does not fulfill any of the international conditions related to the Palestinian issue" (12).

On September 29, 1978, the Knesset approved the Camp David Accords, with 84 Knesset members voting in favor, while 36 members opposed, including members of the Front Party, who stressed their rejection of the agreement, which they considered a betrayal of the Arab nation, and saw it as a departure from Arab and international coordination; because the party found in the program of "self-administration" in the occupied territories announced by Begin,

that it was a continuation of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and a denial of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination, without which there could be no peace in the Middle East (13), and that the Egyptian regime had relinquished the demand to establish an independent Palestinian state and all the areas occupied by "Israel" or the demand to remove the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The party called for the evacuation of all Israeli settlements in the occupied territories that were established after 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside "Israel" and the guarantee of equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel, and the conduct of peace negotiations with all parties (14).

The general trend in "Israel" was strongly inclined to support the agreement with the Egyptian regime in order to put an end to the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and also to split the Arab rally around the Palestinian cause, which is what the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality Party warned against, that this treaty gave legitimacy to the Zionist settlement in the land of Palestine and the occupied Arab lands in the Syrian Golan, and it is an official recognition that it is a land that the Arabs usurped and the Zionists regained, and that this agreement transformed the crimes of the Israelis into resistance and struggle to regain their usurped homeland, and a recognition that the Zionists have one homeland, land and history and that the Palestinian is a usurper, occupier and terrorizer of the Zionist citizen who is safe in his home and on his land (15), and that one of the repercussions of signing the Camp David Agreement was that the recognition of the Zionist enemy was an official public condemnation of the Arab struggle and resistance against the Zionist entity and an acknowledgment of Egypt's abandonment of the land of Palestine (16). On March 22, 1979, the Front Party submitted a draft to the Israeli Knesset through the head of the party's parliamentary bloc, Meir Vilner, which stipulated the Knesset's rejection of the Camp David Agreement because It abandoned Palestinian rights, excluded just peace in the region, and doubled the risk of war breaking out again. As long as the occupation continues in the Palestinian and Syrian territories, peace will not be achieved. The Knesset must reject the plan for Palestinian self-rule under Israeli control. A decision must be issued by the Knesset obligating the Israeli government to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, withdraw from the Golan Heights, and establish a real peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors (17).

But the decision did not see the light and the Speaker of the Knesset Yitzhak Shamir (18), who belongs to the ruling Likud party in "Israel", did not agree to present the project, and did not put it on the agenda of the Knesset session. When Fletcher tried to object to the decision of the Speaker of the Knesset, Shamir threatened to expel him from the session, and stressed that the Knesset, with all its members, had approved the Camp David Accords and that the Knesset had given its approval to continue negotiations with the Egyptian regime, and that no one in "Israel" had the right to object to the agreement as long as it was in the interest of "Israel" (19). With the signing of the final agreement on the Camp David Accords between "Israel" and Egypt in 1979 under the auspices of US President Jimmy Carter, the Front Party issued a statement that said: "The Camp David Accords made the future of the Palestinian issue open and a subject for negotiation between "Israel" and Jordan, and excluded negotiations with the Palestinians

themselves, and made the issue of Jerusalem and settlements without an agreement, which does not change anything in the current situation. The party saw that the Camp David Accords not only deprived the Palestinian people of the right to self-determination and left the Palestinian issue without a settlement, but also placed the Palestinian people under the continuation of The occupation, stressing that accepting the Camp David Accords means surrendering to Israeli dictates and behind them the United States of America, which encouraged the Israeli Prime Minister to say publicly before the Knesset that a Palestinian state will not be established, whatever the circumstances, and that Israel refuses to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, describing it as "terrorist," and that sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be for Israel only. At the end of the statement, the party called for Arab solidarity to fight the agreement, reject it, and not to be led by the Egyptian regime, which is a traitor to the Arab cause (20).

Second / The attitude of Democratic Front for Peace and Equality towards the first Israeli invasion of Lebanese territory in 1978

On the morning of March 11, 1978, a Palestinian guerrilla group led by Dalal Mughrabi (21) succeeded in reaching the shores of Tel Aviv by two boats, without the Israelis being able to discover it due to their lack of correct assessment of the Palestinians' audacity (22). The group succeeded in infiltrating the suburbs of Tel Aviv and seized an Israeli bus, trying to take it towards the Lebanese border. The Israeli government responded to the operation by forming a special army unit led by Ehud Barak (23) to deal with the problem, and surrounded the guerrillas using planes and tanks, which prompted the commander of the operation, Dalal Mughrabi, to blow up the bus and its passengers, which resulted in the killing of 37 Israelis on the bus. As soon as the guerrillas ran out of ammunition, Ehud Barak ordered the killing of all 12 guerrillas with machine guns, and they were all martyred, including Dalal Mughrabi. This was on March 14, 1978 (24).

The party condemned that operation and considered it a terrorist operation against innocent Israeli civilians. The Front Party called for stopping those operations that do not achieve any benefit or international sympathy, especially since those operations only target innocent people and that they harm the just cause of the Palestinian Arab people and give their enemies arguments to push world public opinion to abandon support for the national rights of the Palestinian people, whose justice has been recognized by the United Nations. Just as the party strongly condemns the Israeli actions against innocent people, it also condemns those criminal acts (25).

Israel took advantage of that operation and threatened to launch a military operation in southern Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin confirmed on March 3, 1978 that the operation was nothing but a reflection of Arab hatred for Jews, and threatened to eliminate anyone who provided aid and assistance to the fedayeen group that carried out that crime. Begin attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization and described it as a terrorist organization and refused to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on the pretext that this right means establishing a Palestinian state headed by murderers (26). Israel believed that the perpetrators of the fedayeen operation received training and preparation for the operation in the training camps of the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, especially since the fedayeen

operation was named after “Kamal Adwan” because it came in revenge for Israel’s assassination of a Palestinian leader and others, in addition to other reasons that prompted Israel to carry out this invasion, including on April 21, 1978, the killing of an Israeli soldier by a mine explosion inside Lebanese territory. Israeli leaders considered that the incident was planned and an offensive act (27). The Zionist entity claimed that it aspired to establish a security buffer zone 25 miles north of the Lebanese and Israeli borders, with the aim of distancing Palestinian fighters from this area and reducing the risk of their attacks on Israeli settlements across the border into the Galilee (287). In addition, Israel wanted this operation to impose and tighten its grip on Lebanon, strike and destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization, and expel Syria from Lebanon, as well as create a buffer zone or security belt 40 kilometers deep (29). “Israel” carried out its threat and invaded southern Lebanon on March 14, 1978, and was initially able to occupy the southern region up to the Litani River, with the exception of the city of Tyre, with the participation of 20,000 soldiers. It was known as “Operation Litani,” which lasted six days (30).

The Israeli Knesset, headed by Yitzhak Shamir, unanimously supported the military operation in Lebanon, with the exception of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality party, on the necessity of implementing this operation. The Hadash party rejected the Israeli invasion of Lebanese territory and issued a statement against the Israeli government ((considering it a government with a terrorist orientation that does not distinguish between criminals and innocents and is no different from previous Israeli governments thirsty for Arab blood, and that this operation did not come except after the "vile" understandings with the Egyptian regime regarding the loss of the rights of the Palestinian people. The Front party demanded that "the Israeli government withdraw from Lebanese territory and comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and the Security Council and also withdraw from all occupied territories)) (31).

It also demanded that the Knesset presidency include on its agenda the issue of the Israeli army invading Lebanon. The party said in its letter to the Knesset that the Israeli army's invasion of Lebanon, which began at dawn on March 14, 1978, and the bombing operations by sea, air and on the ground, had inflicted heavy losses on secure civilians in refugee camps and villages, and that this was considered an act of (32) As a result of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, the United Nations decided to deploy UNIFIL forces (33) on the border on March 19, 1978, after the UN Security Council issued two resolutions, 425-426, which stressed the need to stop “Israeli” military operations, withdraw the Israeli army from southern Lebanon, respect Lebanese territory, determine the priorities of the international emergency forces and how to finance them, and set their term of operation at six months, renewable. The Israeli government did not cooperate with the previous Security Council resolutions, but withdrew to the international border after three months, and handed over its positions to the South Lebanon Army led by Saad Haddad (34), which attacked the UN forces, which prompted the Security Council to issue its resolution No. (444), which it issued in January 19, 1979, which demanded that it withdraw all its military forces and civilian cadres from southern Lebanon, to be replaced by the international emergency forces (35).

2. Results:

1. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) party rejected the Camp David Accords because they did not meet any of the Palestinian rights to establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital alongside Israel. The Front party considered that the statements of the Israeli leaders were the greatest evidence of their bad intentions in not recognizing Palestinian rights and their lack of seriousness in withdrawing from the occupied Arab territories, and that the goal sought by the Israelis was to remove Egypt from the Arab ranks and create a deep rift between the Arab positions.

2. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality party looks with one eye at all operations targeting civilians, whether Palestinian or Israeli, which means that the party's vision was based on rejecting violence in all its forms for the purpose of reaching peaceful solutions to the conflict.

3. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality feared that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel and his speech in the Knesset would lead to the signing of a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and that peace would be at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and the occupied Arab territories, especially since the Front denounced President Sadat for not mentioning the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognized internationally and Arab-wise, during his speech in the Knesset and the lack of clarity in his vision for a just peace in the region.

Research margins:

(1) Muhammad Awad Al-Hazaimeh, Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Dar and Library of Al-Hamed for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2010, p. 141.

(2) Al-Ittihad Newspaper, Issue 53, November 15, 1977.

(3) The Israeli Knesset under siege, Emergency Session No. 5/A. Dated November 15, 1977, Knesset Israel, Emergency Session No. 5/A. On November 15, 1977.

(4) Quoted from Al-Ittihad Newspaper, Issue 54, November 18, 1977.

(5) Eliahu Ben Elissar, Sadat and His Legacy EGYPT AND THE WORLD, 1977-1997, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE by Jon B. Alterman, U.K., 1998, p. 15-19.

(6) It is an official Israeli institution established in 1953 by a decision of the Israeli Knesset as a research center on the events of the Holocaust (the Jewish Holocaust during World War II) and to commemorate its victims. The museum administration has established a special wing for arts and handicrafts made by Jews in the camps and related to the situation they were brought to by the Nazis. A wing has also been allocated to commemorate the Jewish children who were killed by the Nazis during World War II. A center was established alongside the museum to train teachers to teach the subject of the Holocaust in schools, so that this center provides supplementary courses, educational curricula, educational plans, and activities to deepen the teaching of the Holocaust in Hebrew schools. The museum is located on Mount Herzl in the western part of the city of Jerusalem. Johnny Mansour, the previous source, p. 519.

- (7) Hassan A. Barari, *The Quest for a Solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Amman: Friedrich, 2009. P. 39.
- (8) Quoted from *Al-Ittihad* newspaper, issue 55, November 22, 1977.
- (9) Sabry Geries, *Arabs in Israel (1973-1979)*, *Palestinian Affairs Magazine*, issue 89, Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, Beirut, April 1979, p. 90.
- (10) Imad Muhammad Al-Masry, *Positions of the Israeli Jewish Parties on the Question of Jerusalem 1979-1991*, *Journal of the American Arab Academy for Science and Technology*, issue 3, Cairo 2011, p. 88.
- (11) Salma Adnan Muhammad, and others, *Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Position of the Arab Gulf States on Them (1975-1982)*, *Journal of the Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies*, Issue 37, 2012, p. 202.
- (12) Document No. (1487, K) dated September 26, 1978, *Democratic Front for Peace and Equality*, p. 1.
- (13) Mashmak Mas' (1487, K), dated September 26, 1978, the position of the Arab Gulf States on the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Position of the Arab Gulf States on Them (1975-1982), *Journal of the Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies*, Issue 37, 2012, p. 202. 13- Minutes of the Israeli Knesset, Regular Session No. 67/A, dated September 29, 1978, Protocol of the Israeli Knesset, Minutes of the Regular Session No. 67/A, dated September 29, 1978,
- (14) Document No. (1487, K) dated September 26, 1978, the previous source, p. 2.
- (15) Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem, 2010, p. p. 58.
- (16) Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, *Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, the Middle East Research & Information Project, Tel Aviv, 2014, p.8.
- (17) Minutes of the Israeli Knesset regular session dated March 22, 1979, session No. 124/A. 22 March 1979.
- (18) Yitzhak Shamir (1915 - 2012), born in Poland, immigrated to Palestine in 1935, joined the Irgun organization, then the Stern organization and became its leader. After the 1948 war, Shamir joined the Mossad from 1955 to 1965. He won a seat in the Israeli Knesset in 1973, and assumed the presidency of the Israeli Knesset in 1977, then became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1980. He was elected Prime Minister with Begin's resignation from his position in October 1983, then Prime Minister for a second time from 1988-1992. Johnny Mansour, the previous source, p. 283.
- (19) Minutes of the Israeli Knesset regular session dated March 22, 1979, the previous source.
- (20) Quoted from Shaul Arieli, *The Camp David Accords and Their Impact on the Arabs in Israel*, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem, 1992, p. 24.

(21) Dalal Mughrabi: She was born in the Sabra refugee camp near Beirut to a Palestinian father and a Lebanese mother. This family fled to Lebanon after the Arab defeat in the 1948 war, where she completed her elementary education at Ya'bad School, and then her middle school education at Haifa School. These two schools were affiliated with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the capital, Beirut. She participated in the Deir Yassin group. She was martyred in the suicide operation: For more, see: <http://ar.wikipadie.org/wiki>.

(22) The Invasion of Lebanon, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer, 1978), Journal of Palestine Studies, p. 133.

(23) Ehud Barak: He is a Zionist politician, born on February 2, 1942, in the settlement of Al-Kibbus. He joined the Israeli army in 1959. He participated in the 1967 war, and was appointed commander of the special forces. He became prominent through his participation in the operation to free the hostages of the hijacked Belgian plane. He rose through the ranks until he became Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli army in 1991, and became Minister of the Interior in 1995. After that, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then became Speaker of the Knesset in 1997. He was nominated for the position of Prime Minister of Israel in December 2000. He announced his retirement from political work in 2012. For more, see: Nidal Khazal Ghadban, The Position of the United States of America on the Hijacking of Aircraft and the Detention of Hostages in the Shadow of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1968-1974), unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Basra , Faculty of Education for Humanities, 2022, p. 191; Maher Daoud, Reading the Biography of Ehud Barak, Israeli Issues, Issue 61, p. 122

(24) Akiva J. Lorenz, The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel, Jerusalem, 2007, p. 10.

(25) Levi Naeman, Arab Parties and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, Ben-Gurion University, Jerusalem, 1996, p. 15.

(26) Hatem Rahi Al-Zuwaie and Rabah Marza, The Israeli position on the Lebanese civil war 1975-1983, Journal of Humanities, Vol. 33, No. 3, University of Babylon, 2016, p. 4.

(27) Habeeba Ghayaba, The Israeli Need for Lebanon 1982-1985, Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Mohamed Kheider-Biskra, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences - Qutb Shatma-Department of Humanities, 2016, p. 45.

(28) Abdul Hakim Amer Mahmoud Lafi, The American Role in the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948-1982, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Arts, Islamic University of Gaza-Palestine, 2011, p. 175.

(29) Saad Aziz Dakhel, Iran and its Role in Lebanon during the Israeli Invasion in 1982, Center for Gulf Studies, University of Basra, pp. 357-358.

(30) Elias Saba, Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (From the October War to the Wars of Paths Through the May 17 Agreement), Dar Al-Jadeed, Beirut, 2000, p. 314.

(31) Quoted from the Israeli Knesset, regular session No. 108/A, dated March 15, 1978. Israeli Knesset, regular session No. 108/A, dated March 15, 1978.

(32) Israeli Knesset, regular session No. 108/A, dated March 15, 1978, previous source.

(33) UNIFIL Forces: Temporary international forces formed in 1978 after Operation Litani, according to Security Council Resolution No. 425, under the command of General Emmanuel Ersekne, and were entrusted with the task of following up on the (Israeli) withdrawal from Lebanon, and restoring security and peace to it, in addition to building and restoring the sovereignty of the Lebanese government. The following countries participated in these forces: France, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Norway, Nigeria, and others. The French battalion was one of the vanguards of the UNIFIL force that arrived in Lebanon, and the number of members of that battalion reached (703) between officers and soldiers. For more, see: Antoine Najm, *The Temporary International Forces Operating in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*, Lebanese Army Magazine, Issue 272, Year 24, 2008, Lebanese Ministry of Defense, pp. 69-74. 34- Saad Haddad: He is an officer in the Lebanese army. He was born in the Lebanese town of Marjeyoun. He rose through the ranks in the Lebanese army, but he announced his defection from the Lebanese army and the formation of the so-called Free Lebanon State following the Israeli violations of southern Lebanon and the formation of militias on the Lebanese-Israeli border after the Zionist army invaded Lebanon in 1982. For more, see: Abbas Qasim Faraj Karam Al-Muzani, *Hezbollah and its political role in Lebanon 1989-2000*, unpublished master's thesis, Al-Mustansiriya University, College of Education, Department of History, 2020, p. 33.

(35) Hatem Rahi Al-Zubaidi and Riyah Marza Al-Madhti, the previous source, p. 19.

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