

Revival of China and the United States Strategy to Contain at Indo-Pacific Region (From Rebalance to Offshore Balancing)

Rizal Darma Putra¹, Arfin Sudirman², Wawan Budi Darmawan², Yusa Djuyandi³

¹International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

²Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

³Department of Political Science, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

Email: rizal21006@mail.unpad.ac.id

Abstract

Chinese foreign policy initiative has turned out to be a negative reaction from the United States of America (USA) and its allies, as it is perceived to contain the agenda for territorial expansion in the sense of an expanding political influence covered by infra structures and trade investment activities. Along with the darkening of a OBOR (one belt, one road) map followed by the interests of China to secure the Silk Road through the presence of its military force. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, including Indonesia have expressed their complaints regarding China's claims to the South China Sea. China has already positioned as regional power that "challenges" a vis-a-vis the United States as a superpower that maintains a status-quo continuity in the Indo-Pacific hemisphere. This research used qualitative research method, data collected through interviews with informants to be able to dig up information so that accurate information can be obtained in accordance with the theme of this study. The selection of informants was determined using a purposive technique. While secondary data collected from various relevant documents. This research analyzes that The United States' foreign policy to stem the rise and expansion of China's impact in the Asia-Pacific region, harmonizes with concerns from several countries in the region for the rise of China with its foreign policy judged assertive. Setting out from the policy to stem the China influence, it can be said, the United States of America refers to its experience in the cold war as it stemming the expanding influence of the Soviet Union through the Containment Policy. Only this time has the United States been confronted with such vastly different conditions. These conditions that the United States is unable to "brace" for, so containment policy repetition through some of its implementation such as rebalance, free and open indo-pacific to offshore balancing still test its effectiveness.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, United States, China, Indo-Pacific, Military Force.

1. Introduction

As a big country, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has established its power in Asia. China is trying to realize its ambition to become a world superpower, which is targeted to be realized in 2049, on the 100th anniversary of the country's rise on the single party of communists. Surely such ambitions would have a consequence of the sphere of interest and sphere of influence between the PRC and other major states and the United States, both at the regional and global levels. The sphere of interest and sphere of influence will be run in various sectors, from trade and economy to specific access to natural resources, strategic sectors in conserving bilateral/multilateral alliance influence to military competition.

The economic growth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has proliferated since the era of Deng Xiaoping, contributing to its military development, thereby reducing military modernization rest on the quantitative approach as was the case with the era of Mao Zedong. This military modernization was formally inducted into doctrine in 1985 by the Central Military Commission that adopted Deng Xiaoping's proposal of military modernization, called "the War Doctrine of the People's Liberation Army; Active Defense Strategies in The New Era." Active in this case is to withstand enemy attacks outside the keys of the state of PRC, which should be done outside the borders (Ji, 1999). Guidelines on the doctrine emphasized how to have the ability to withstand enemy attacks outside the territory of the PRC, the People's Liberation Army PRC was required to become a modern army both in the primary equipment of the armament system and in the ability of the title of army.

The Chinese communist party has assigned PLA to develop capabilities to project its powers beyond the borders of China and periphery to secure PRC interest abroad and improve the attainment of foreign policy. As for one example of modernization by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) China, for example; PLA continues to pursue leadership in potential military technologies, such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, an upgraded computerization, quantum information sciences, biotechnology and manufacturing and advanced materials. So in 2020, the PLA funded a number of artificial intelligence projects focused on machine applications that could learn recommendations and tactics, artificial intelligence enable wargaming for exercise, and social media analysis (Defense, 2021).

In view of the national threat, PLA in addition to preparing for the conventional war also requires modern warfare. This is because there is a potential threat not only of the possibility of armed conflict around the region bordering its country but also of armed conflict with the use of nuclear weapons. PLA therefore prepared herself for two potential scenarios, first with what is referred to as the inevitable possibility of border warfare, the next being something unlikable but must be prepared as a possible nuclear war. For example: border wars, territorial conflicts, local wars are partialized and limited according to high tech conditions. That condition is something that PLA must face, that of preparing for India, Vietnam, and other neighboring countries. A three-dimensional modern war of nuclear weapons that could pose a threat. This is a highly unpopular tool but can be found in the case of the Taiwan declaration of independence which at the next stage will lead to the presence of the People's Republic of China with the United States (Dutta, 1998).

Which provides grounds for consideration for the PRC to prepare its armed forces in dealing with such two war scenarios mentioned earlier as border wars and modern three-dimensional wars, it is also due, among other things, to the geographic factors of the PRC in regard to its regional interests. In this case the PRC has a territorial interest in the dispute involved:

1. Russia along Ussuri river and along the Sino-Russian western border of Mongolia,
2. India relating to the Aksia region of China and in northeast India that relates to the Mac Mahon line, then to Arunachal Pradesh's status,
3. South China sea on claims against the Spratley islands by China and some southeast Asian countries,
4. Japan over the Senkaku islands,
5. Taiwan, both concerning the political status of the island of Taiwan and about the authority to rule over the island (Tellis, 2000).

Potential threats translated as two such war scenarios; Border wars and modern 3 dimension wars that use nuclear weapons as weapons of threat, so the PLA views the threat's potential as an external factor that encourages military modernization. As it is known that military modernization is also part of a 4 modernization program (modernizing agriculture, industry, defense and science and technology) proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Then the rapid growth of the People's Republic of China in an economic sense, which in this respect harmonizes with its military development, would naturally produce a logical reaction to its efforts to manifest its national interests.

The national importance of the China today presented in the form of foreign policy automatically affects the constellation of the region, resulting in a variety of reactions from both Asian countries and superpowers such as the United States and its allies, the foreign policy initiative One Belt One Road (OBOR). In September 2013, China's President, Xi Jinping, officially announced the Economic Belt of the Silk Road in Kazakhstan and then expanded the program for Maritime Silk in February 2014, which is known as The Belt and Road Initiative, to open a massive trade. And encourage economic development with what is called a belt - land routes from western China across central Asia to the Middle East - to the purported roads; Maritime routes around Southeast Asia, the Persian gulf, and the Africa horn (Viehe, 2015).

Regional Ambitions and Chinese Military Capabilities

The Chinese foreign policy initiative has turned out to be a negative reaction from the US and allies, as it is perceived to contain the agenda for territorial expansion in the sense of an expanding political influence covered by infra structures and trade investment activities. Along with the darkening of a OBOR map followed by the interests of China to secure the Silk Road through the presence of its military force. Where this became particularly apparent during the Periphery Diplomacy conference, Xi Jinping said that China's neighbors had "exceptionally critical key esteem". Furthermore, he stated that he needs to strengthen the economy, expand security cooperation, and advance China's relations with its neighbors. Maintaining stability and the Chinese context could be a primary goal of peripheral diplomacy. China should to energize

and take an interest within the handle of territorial economic integration, expediting the advancement of infra structures and network. China also have to be construct an financial belt on the Silk Street and 21-century Oceanic Silk Street, make a modern territorial economy arrange. In order to uphold regional stability and reaffirm China's leadership in the nation's environment, Xi evidently views China's substantial economic resources as a key instrument (Cai, 2017).

As the Indo Pacific grows, China's defense budget has been raising significantly over the past decade, thus demonstrating the PRC's ambition as a regional power in East Asia and followed by India. In 2019, the two countries are the second and third largest military shopper after the United States, with an estimated PRC allocate around US \$261 billion in 2019 and India around US \$71.1 billion. 2019 marks the first year that China and India are among the world's top three military shoppers according to SIPRI (Panda, 2020). China aims to increase its yearly defense spending by 7.1% to 1.45 trillion yuan (US \$230 billion) for fiscal year 2022 (Lei, 2022).

With significant increases in defense budgets in the last decade of these two great Asian countries, tensions in the region will continue to rise as the presence of the US in the Indo-Pacific region in the form of a number of defense alliances with several countries that are in the rivals of the People's Republic of China, or even territorial disputes on land and sea. As well as the country's geographical position is quite strategic, as well as, of course, by reinforcing co-defense with its traditional allies in the region of Asia. Where, in this case, the United States, together with a number of countries in the region of Asia under its cooperation or influence, uses the Indo-Pacific terminology to build regional partnerships to stem the flow of Chinese influence in the region.

The Indo-Pacific Conception as Containment Strategy

Since former US President Donald Trump mentioned "Indo-Pacific territory" during his first trip of Asia, the President of the Foreign Policy Institute and Research Director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, Kuni Miyake, emphasizes that the term "Indo-Pacific" which has been used in a variety of ways. From this, Miyake views the Indo-Pacific as a way of defining the new geopolitical view of Asia, as well as a different way of labeling the region known as the Asia-Pacific, giving emphasis to the revival of India in the face of China's growing global challenge (Yadav, 2022).

A number of countries that promote the Indo-Pacific concept are; The United States, India, Japan and Australia, to become known as The Quad. Officially The Quad is a fourth-level security dialogue forum, made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Maritime cooperation between them started after the 2004 tsunami. But today they are dynamic economic democracies, with a broader work agenda, including addressing safety issues, economics, and health (Smith, 2021). So the mention of the Indo-Pacific term is not merely a reference to a geographical understanding, but rather a conception of foreign policy involved a number of countries as stated above, where a number of countries share the same interest in the region as assertive the revival of China.

From the China point of view, Trump's procedure has supplanted the Obama administration's arrangement of "rebalancing" or reorientation towards Asia (turn to Asia). For China examiners,

its objective is apparent: the United States is concerned with keeping up its matchless quality within the region (and globally) and with abating down or containing China's further rise. The most noteworthy shortcoming of the Indo-Pacific concept from the point of view of Chinese examiners is that it does not yet have a valid financial measurement or column and thus does not constitute a genuine challenge to China's engaging quality as a exchange speculation accomplice (counting inside the system of Belt and Street Activity). This feedback applies over all to the United States, whose Indo-Pacific strategy (Free and Open Indo Pacific/FOIP) centers basically on security. Due to the dissimilar financial interface of the four primary advocates of the Indo-Pacific, China specialists address the longterm reasonability of the concept (Heiduk and Wacker, 2020).

In fact, former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, coined the phrase "Indo-Pacific" during a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament (Abe, 2007). However, the Obama administration conceptualized the Indo-Pacific as the cornerstone of US foreign strategy in Asia. Hillary Clinton coined the term "Indo-Pacific" to refer to the region that stretched from the Indian to the Pacific oceans in a 2011 article for the magazine *Foreign Policy*. She noted the region's importance to the US regional standing. The new Indo-Pacific region is commonly seen as a response to the US and its allies to the extending of China influence in critical regions of the Pacific and Indian Ocean (Denisov, 2021). Through this new concept the United States of America offers the following views of the norms that are referral for promotion and even implemented as policy in foreign policy.

The Indo-Pacific region is seen by the United States of America as a free and open space composed of powerful, autonomous, and affluent nations. The entire administration is working to advance an open and free Indo-Pacific region with a focus on three key areas: security, governance, and economy. Ensuring the freedom of the seas and the skies; defending sovereign states from outside forces; fostering market-based economies, open investment, and fair and reciprocated trade; and endorsing good governance and respect for individual rights are the tenets upon which this vision is based (Website, 2020). Judging by the norms promoted by the United States and its Allies toward the Indo-Pacific region, there has been marked opposition to China's policies against it, particularly in regard to freedom of navigation and flight across the southern China sea. Likewise, the unilateral appropriation of ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) by China unilaterally does not only conflict with the norms promoted by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region but also increase tension over countries whose territories are partially included in ADIZ.

ADIZ is airspace outside the sovereign territory of a country where the country requires the identification, location and traffic control of aircraft for reasons of national security. The mechanism is a legacy of the Cold War, first announced by the United States in 1950. More than 20 states now operate their own ADIZ system. According to China's Ministry of National Defense, all aircraft must identify themselves in a zone, such as the one declared over the East China Sea, declare flight plans and report their exact location to ground control upon arrival. Such regulations apply to both commercial and military aircraft. In the latter case, China's ADIZ does not follow the normative principle that only military aircraft passing through the ADIZ

should not be required to report to the host country. China has threatened to pursue "military defense measures" (Severson, 2015).

The United States emphasizes the importance of access to free navigation in the Indo-Pacific region as in patrol and deployment of military force in the region. This stance supports the United States vision of preserving and trade agreements of \$1.9 trillion with Indo-Pacific countries involving government institution, the private sector, and other institutions (Pompeo, 2019).

A number of countries with territorial issues in the South China Sea, such as the Philippines, have complained about the nine-dash line that claimed on a map of China that cut out the waters of some Southeast Asian countries, bringing the matter to international arbitration court in the Hague, the Netherlands, where the arbitration court on the South China sea issue was released on Tuesday, July 12, 2016. One of the results of that ruling mentions that the court rejected the claim of China on economic rights in the region that had been marked by nine-dash line. "There is no legal basis for China to claim a historically based right to resources in the region of the deep water that includes nine-dash line." The claim of China is marked by nine-dash lines, which covers hundreds of islands, coral reefs, and other areas that intersects with the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and Indonesia (Samosir, 2016; Budiana, Fedryansyah, Djuyandi, Pancasilawan, 2019). In spite of the arbitration court's ruling that China has no validity to the waters, but China persists in its claim by referring to historical factors. Of course, that argument is not only unacceptable to countries involved in claims or countries won in the arbitration court, but the United States and its allied states cannot accept because China is judged to be in violation the principles freedom of navigation.

For China to affirm its claim on the south China sea was a step to take in view of the continuity of the OBOR policy that included the Maritime Silk Road in the Southern China sea passage was a package integrated in pursuing regional ambitions through the project of the OBOR. Even to reaffirm his claim, China released Maritime Laws that intensified tensions in the region. The Beijing rule requires foreign vessels to notify maritime authorities before entering "Chinese territorial waters," providing precise information such as the ship's name, call sign, position, next port, and projected arrival time.

The United States and its collaborative countries are interested in keeping the status-quo in the Indo-Pacific region, while China through the OBOR agenda for implementation is not just a number of programs or investment projects or a mere trade in what is defined as a Silk Road both on land and on the ocean. But it also affirms territorial claims that are interpreted as a prerequisite to ensure the safety of the region. Thus, it could be said that China has already positioned as regional power that "challenges" a vis-a-vis the United States as a superpower that maintains a status-quo continuity in the Indo-Pacific hemisphere.

2. Method

A qualitative research approach design is used in this investigation. By keeping us in intimate proximity to the empirical reality, qualitative researchers highlight the significance of their work. The reason the researcher used qualitative methods in this study was because the researcher

analyzed the foreign policy of the United States during the time of President Joseph R. Biden, namely the modified containment policy to restrain the expansion of China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Researchers collect data through interviews with informants to be able to dig up information so that accurate information can be obtained in accordance with the theme of this study.

The selection of informants was determined using a purposive technique, i.e. selected with the consideration that the informants really mastered the problem, had complete and accurate data and were willing to provide data openly, honestly and objectively regarding US foreign policy in the form of modifications to the containment policy aimed at China, as follows the phenomenon of assertive China's rise. They (informants) selected here come from officials of the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington DC and Center for New American Security (CNAS) Washington DC. The choice of the two think tanks is because they are the reference institutions of the Department of State and Department of Defense. Meanwhile, in order to obtain information from the side of the People's Republic of China, the researchers collected data from academics from Jinan University Guangzhou, which is also one of the reference institutions of the China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Secondary data in this study were obtained through the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (Directorate General of Defense Strategy), US Department of State, US Department of Defense, Center for New American Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington DC, Jinan University People Republic of China,. The use of secondary data here pays attention to several things including: the data used is data that is in accordance with research needs, what the researcher wants, as well as the suitability of the costs needed to collect secondary data.

3. Discussion

The United States foreign policy towards China

Foreign policy has an action element, that is, something governments do to other countries to influence orientation, perform a role or to achieve and maintain a certain goal (Holsti, 1987). George Modelski defined foreign policy as the "activity system" developed by one country to change the behavior of another and adapt the country's own activities to the international environment. While according to Norman Padelford and George Lincoln, foreign policy refers to a country's actions taken to attain a national purpose that extends outside its own jurisdiction (Bakry, 2017). Based on descriptions of Holsti, Modelski, Padelford and Lincoln the essence of foreign policy is that the national interests of a country be accepted by a country or other countries. Which in this case certainly can play a significant role in realizing how its national interests can be accepted.

The dramatic increases in power and influence of China's international forces, especially since about 2000, have created a 'resurrection dilemma' that is increasing - or China is trying to gather comprehensive forces, the more it will have to face external pressure on its resurrection from

other countries - in which case all across the United States are dependent upon the alliance and partnership of security in the region, Beijing will increasingly strive to cultivate relationships with other countries (Lyons, 2022). The reconstruction of China and its efforts in building power in the region has resulted in a response from the United States as a hegemon state, for America assessed the emergence of China as a potentially volatile act for the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region, resulting in an impossible challenge in response by the United States' foreign policy authority.

The international challenge requires democratic political leaders to garner support for their initiatives. Support comes from various groups that give legitimacy to governments. Legislators, voters, bureaucracy and interest groups, for example, can offer support. Domestic politics, economic realities, and public opinion are the most significant variables in shaping foreign policy. For the United States, the iron triangle of congress, the pentagon, and the defense industry are often seen as the driving force of expensive arms and the sale of arms to other countries. Sales of weapons and other technologies are carried out as tools for foreign policy (Mintz and Derouen Jr., 2010).

At their latest summit in Madrid, NATO leaders approved a new strategic concept that takes much of the wording from last year's Brussels summit and outlines what the members of the alliance will do. Specifically, the strategic concept states that NATO "increases our collective awareness, improves our resilience and readiness, and defends against China's coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance." The actions mentioned above show how the Biden administration is attempting to balance these conflicting interests. The ups and downs of this partnership in the upcoming years are impossible to foresee. The measurements above demonstrate that. Whether or whether it is effective, the administration is pursuing American interests both locally and internationally by taking a consistent and cogent stance toward China, utilizing partners when necessary but acting independently when necessary (Mousavizadeh, 2022).

Rebalance

The Obama administration held a policy called "rebalance," launched in the early fall of 2011 to take a broader step and intensify the significant role of the U.S.A. in the Asia Pacific region. The rebalance explicitly identifies the Asia Pacific region as a priority for the United States. Obama's administration is shifting its geographical attention to the region. Rebalance into a grand strategy from U.S. foreign policy under Obama's administration. Furthermore, in the terminology of rebalance policy, is followed by the 3 initiative elements: Security, Economics and Diplomacy. Although there are three elements of the United States rebalance policy initiative, security measures are implemented in the form of the presence of the United States military force as essential to the policy. The United States substantially shifts its military capabilities into the mandala Pacific Asia operation to restructure regional security co-operation to increase the deployment of U.S. forces across territory. This includes a new deployment in military support for Australia and the Philippines, as well as for security cooperation with several regional partners that emphasize a large number of military power integration (Robert G. Sutter, 2013). In fact, the development of security cooperation shows increased quality, both in terms of

training, military aid, the exchange of information, and the inclusion of several other countries in the region, primarily to promote the value and spirit of freedom of navigation.

The deployment of several major U.S. weapons systems to several southeast Asian countries, it is also part of the "rebalance" policy imposition, one of which is linked to increasing tension in the south China sea. The deployment of the four combat ships to Singapore starting in 2013, not only as a road so the United States can quickly mobilize its naval power over an issue of the south China sea, but it can impliciously be seen as a threat to China. Beijing's concern since the middle of 2000 is called a "Malacca Dilemma", with huge amounts of its energy resources imported through narrow straits in southeast Asia, especially in the Malaka strait. This increases the country's vulnerability to strait disruptions, and then the deployment of littoral combat ship, which docked in the malaka strait, may be interpreted as an implicit message from the United States to be able to interfere with China vessels when needed (Till, 2012). Among other indications from America for containment of China were U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited Vietnam on June 1, 2015, to meet with Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh. At the meeting, Carter was discussing his call to end the construction of an island in the south China sea by China. They signed the memorandum of understanding to guide future military cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore Carter said the us would help Vietnam build a place and train their military forces. Phung also said that Carter visited Vietnam's naval and coast guard headquarters and promised to provide \$2.3 billion in aid to buy their patrol ships (Hanggoro & Putri, 2015)

For rebalance policies to work effectively, the United States follows up with a number of policy deductions, as well as by expanding and mobilizing the maritime powers of the United States in east and west Asia. Maritime powers were shaped as the core of the military strategy for rebalance. In the context of rebalance's release, the United States Navy Chief, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, underlines the three principal duties of the United States navy; First, more deployment and deployment of naval units in the Asia Pacific region. Second, increasing the capability of these units to be vigilant in the prospect of future wars. Finally, increasing military cooperation with Allies in Asia Pacific, at the same time enforcing co-operation (Alenezi, 2000)

Meanwhile, another element in rebalance is diplomacy as a tool for the United States' efforts to stem the China power in Asia. Among other things is what U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton did in July 2009, signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which in this case specifies that the United States as a permanent delegate in the annual meeting of the ASEAN Minister of Defense (ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus), then in November 2011 President Obama for the first time appointed a permanent ambassador to ASEAN. In November 2015, relations between the United States and the ASEAN countries increased to be at a strategic partnership level. It may be said that this deep engagement from the United States was welcomed by the ASEAN states for reasons of panic over the increasing escalation of China's behaviour in the south China sea (Lai, Troxell and Gellert, 2018)

Free and Open Indo Pacific

There has been a consistent policy continuity between President Donald Trump and his prior administration under President Obama, particularly with regard to the United States' foreign

policy toward China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The conventional pillars of US involvement in the Indo-Pacific area are upheld by the Indo-Pacific concept of the Trump administration: fostering economic growth, encouraging good governance and shared values, and establishing collective security through networks of regional partners and Allies (Ford, 2020). As for the interesting foreign policy of Trump in stemming China via the Indo-Pacific concept, it is, among other things, the background of the economic factors associated with the presence and expansion of influence of the China Communist Party. Where in this case President Donald Trump's reign listed one of the reasons for containment listed on the White House document, its purpose is to prevent China industrial policies and unfair trade practices from distorting the global market and damaging the competitiveness of the United States. The measures recommended by him are to counter the practices of Chinese predators who froze foreign rivalry, weakened the economic competitiveness of the United States, and conspired with the aspirations of the Chinese Communist Party to dominate the 21st century economy (India, 2021). Based on the policy of security in the Indo-Pacific strategy, United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis, on his Shangri-la 17th dialogue, says the Indo-Pacific strategy includes four parts: increasing maritime security, deepening military cooperation with allies and partners, reinforcing the supremacy of law, civil society, and government, transportation and promoting market-led economic development (Helmy, 2018). While it may be said that foreign policy with the Indo-Pacific concept was released since 2011 in the era of President Obama, President Donald Trump again put emphasis on what is called free and open Indo-Pacific.

Offshore Balancing

The elected of Joseph R. Biden Jr. as the 46th President of the United States may be said that foreign policy still places China as the leading rival of the U.S.A. So Joe Biden, as Vice President of the Obama era, adopted the rebalance foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific context, is seen following the same pattern of stemming the influence of China as it did by previous presidents. It can be seen as an Interim National Security Strategic Studies, released by the White House for the Renewing America's Advantage, which lists, among other things, "the effective path for America to advance authoritarian China and increasingly assertive is to invest our society, our economy and our democracy. By restoring the credibility of the United States and reaffirming the future of our global leadership, we will see to it that America, not China, is organizing an international agenda, through cooperation with others to establish global treaties and norms that can promote our interests and reflect our values. We will also fend off China's aggression and challenges to the shared security, prosperity, and democratic ideals by fortifying and maintaining our unmatched allies and partners and making astute defense investments. We will not stop defending, in accordance with international law, access to worldwide interests, such as the freedom of navigation and the right to fly. To protect our friends, we'll adopt diplomatic and military stances" (Jr., 2021).

Even President Biden has been seen reinforce this Indo-Pacific foreign policy by conducting high levels of the Quad states of India, Japan and Australia in Washington DC on September 24, 2021. The four chiefs of state issued a unified statement in which they stated, among other things, that The United States supports the supremacy of law, freedom of navigation and flight, peaceful conflict resolution, democratic ideals, and territorial integrity of countries. Following their

discussions, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and US President Joe Biden issued a statement (Halkett, 2021). Within a month, in a meeting with ASEAN's leader, "President Biden underscores the U.S. uncompromising commitment to the region and promises to deepen cooperation in the face of challenges, which includes cooperation with allies and partners to deal with threats to an international regulatory order and also promotes a free and open indo-pacific" (Dinata, 2021). It is thus increasingly apparent that through a number of high levels of meetings both with the head of the Quad and with the leader of the ASEAN, that President Biden administered the consistent foreign policy of the United States from his predecessor through the Indo-Pacific concept. Certainly in this case the vision and values or norms carried by the United States through the Indo-Pacific concept are, to stem the influence of China and its unilateral policies like the region of the South China Sea.

The Indo-Pacific term was released by Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe in 2007, and was later strengthened by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. On the other hand, Xi Jinping explicitly delivered the "Belt and Road Initiative" in Kazakhstan in 2013. It shows that before the birth of the OBOR, the US and its allies had already placed the People's Republic of China as a country that had to be suppressed.

China has been judged to be carrying out its foreign policy that endangers the United States and a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and threatens the continuity of status in the region. So the United States feels the need to shore up and build a closer ally, in the Indo-Pacific concepts followed by several foreign policies on China adopted by each U.S. President since Obama's Rebalance, and Donald Trump through his resolution with Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and Joe Biden in Renewing America's Advantage. As for the implementation of America's foreign policy to stem the Chinese revival judged assertive, it can be said that Joe Biden's administration is implementing Offshore Policy.

Offshore Balancing is a balance of power strategies, not a hegemonic one. It is assumed that the US will be safer in a multi-polar system than trying to maintain its current leadership (Layne, 1997). Considering the factors of defense expenditure and the need for geopolitics to cement links with partnerships across Pacific Asia, the option of implementing Offshore Balancing policy is considered to be the United States' strategy choice, although the consequences of solidifying multipolarism buildings.

Every major power wants to dominate the world, but no one has or may have the military's ability to become a global hegemon. Thus the ultimate goal of the great power was to reach regional hegemony and obstruct the emergence of equal competitors in distant regions of the world. In essence, countries that benefit from regional hegemonic are offshore balancer (Mearsheimer) in other areas (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Offshore Balancing will talk about U.S. power, when it comes to the challenges of reemergence of China. Where Japan and India can show their important role in the offshore balance strategy, because they are a considerable force in Asia (McClam, 2016). Nevertheless, historically, India has been untested as a strategic ally of the United States in stemming China's influence, especially in the region of South Asia there is a Pakistan factor that has historically long affinity

with India, thereby potentially complicating America's efforts to enhance its strategic relationship capabilities, Especially has Pakistan been a major ally of the United States both during the cold war and the "war on terror" era.

4. Conclusion

The United States' foreign policy to stem the rise and expansion of China's impact in the asia-pacific region, harmonizes with concerns from several countries in the region for the rise of China with its foreign policy judged assertive. Where a number of countries especially India, Australia, Japan, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and the Philippines can be said to be the ones who feel that they are directly putting China at risk as a potential national threat.

Setting out from the policy to stem the China influence, it can be said, the U.S.A., refers to its experience in the cold war as it stemming the expanding influence of the Soviet union through the Containment Policy. Only this time has the United States been confronted with such vastly different conditions, China has immense economic power and strong influence on Asian countries and parts of Africa, nota bene, are relatively dependent on China's economic power, both in terms of investment, trade and development of infra structures. These conditions that the United States is unable to "brace" for, so containment policy repetition through some of its implementation such as rebalance, free and open indo-pacific to offshore balancing still test its effectiveness.

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